CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SAMS

ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL

ASS'Y P/N: 57706307

THEA 1				SS' HOMENCERIONE; V	
AEF.	REV.	MARE CITY & DRAWING RÉF. DESIGNATION	CAUSE AND CAUSE HODE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOUR / FUNC. 1/1 . MATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE CRITICALITY
510		JOINT SELECT SWITCH OFF-1 P/M PS 87840 ME 452-0093. ED 92020 SKEET 1	MODE: SUITCH POSITION TO DOES NOT MATCH JOINT DRIVEN AND DAIA DISPLAYED. CAUSE(\$): (1) MIPER FAILS TO OME POSITION.	D/D WAFER: ONLY ONE JOINT WILL DRIVE IN DIRECT. SINGLE WAFER: ONLY ONE JOINT WILL DRIVE IN SINGLE AND ONLY ONE SEI OF DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED. WORST CASE UNEMPECTED MOTION, WRONG JOINT DRIVES. UNANMINCIATED. CREW ACTION REG. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING N/A	DESIGN FEATURES MOTARY SWITCHES USED ON THE DEC PANEL ARE HERNETICALLY SEALED, AND OF A NATURE AND PROVEN DESIGN. THESE SWITCHES ARE IN COMMON USE ON THE ORBITER VEHICLE. THE SWITCHES ARE CONTROLLED BY ROCKWELL INTERNATIONAL SPECIFICATION HC 452-0049 AND HAVE BEEN QUALIFIED TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THIS SPECIFICATION. ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS TO THE SWITCH ARE ACHIEVED BY MEANS OF A MAITING PAIR OF MS TYPE CIRCULAR CONNECTORS USING CRIMP STYLE CONTACTS. WIRING TO SWITCH CONNECTORS USING CRIMP STYLE CONTACTS. WIRING TO SWITCH CONNECTORS USING CRIMP STYLE CONTACTS. WIRING TO SWITCH CONVECTORS WITH A POLYAMIDE INSULATION. THE WIRING HARNESS IS DESIGNED TO BE CAPABLE OF SEPARATE TESTING (FOR INSULATION RESISTANCE DIELECTRIC STRENGTH, AND CONTINUITY). THIS SWITCH IS NOUNTED TO THE DAC PANEL BY MEANS OF THREE 6-32 PASTEMENTS. AFTER INSTALLATION AND TORQUING EACH SCREW HEAD IS STAKED TO THE PANEL USING A BLOB OF EPONY ADMESIVE. A DOWEL PIN, INTEGRAL TO THE WITCH BOOY, ENCACES WITH THE PANEL TO PROVIDE ROTATION RESISTANCE MAINTENER ARE NO RESONANCES IN THE STRUCTURE BAS DEMONSTRATED THAT INFER ARE NO RESONANCES IN THE RELEVANT VIBRATION FREQUENCY SPECIFUM. THIS AWALTSIS HAS BEEN VERTIFIED BY VIBRATION FREQUENCY SPECIFUM. THIS AWALTSIS HAS BEEN VERTIFIED BY VIBRATION FREQUENCY SPECIFUM. THIS AWALTSIS HAS BEEN VERTIFIED BY VIBRATION FREQUENCY SPECIFUM. THIS AWALTSIS HAS BEEN VERTIFIED BY VIBRATION FREQUENCY SPECIFUM. THIS AWALTSIS HAS BEEN VERTIFIED BY VIBRATION HEAVEN BY THE STANCE OF THE STANCE CONTACT DROP AT RAPED CURRENT, RANDOM VIBRATION (AS MINUTES FOR AXIS), SHOCK (20G-3 AXES), 25000 CYCLES ACTIVATION AT RATED DC CUMRENT, LEXAMICA RUN-THM, DIELECTRIC WITHSTANDING VOLTAGE, CONTACT RESISTANCE, ACCEPTANCE VIBRATION, SEAL TEST, VISUAL EXAMINATION AND FINAL PERFORMANCE TEST.
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PREPARED BY: MFMG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

APPROVED BY: _

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PREPARED BY: MENG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86

SYSTEM: DAC SUBSYSTEM ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET: ____2

SUITCH GIV-1 P/M PS 87840 ME 452-0093. ED 92020 SHEET 1 DATA DISPLAYED. CARSE(S): (1) MIPER FAILS 10 OME POSITION. WORST CASE UNEXPECTED MOTION. URONG JOHN DRIVES. UNEXPECTED MOTION. URONG JOHN DRIVES. UNEXPECTED MOTION. URONG JOHN DRIVES. UNAMAMICIATEO. CREW ACTION REQ. O MAA O MAA	PTANCE TESTS MARDUARE ITEM IS SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING ACCEPTANCE INCOMMENTAL TESTS AS PART OF THE DEC PANEL ASSEMBLY. JURANTION: LEVEL AND DUMATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1 IMERINAL: *110 DEGREES F TO PLUS 10 DEGREES F (2 CYCLES - 9.5 MRS/CYCLE.) DAC PAMEL ASSEMBLY IS FURTHER TESTED AS PART OF THE RMS IEM TESTS (TPSTB RMS STRONGBACK TEST AND TPSS2 FLAT FLOOR I) WHICH VERIFIES THE ABSENCE OF THE FAILURE MODE. LIFICATION TESTS SMITCH TIEM HAS BEEN SUBJECTED TO THE FOLLOWING INFECTION TEST ENVIRONMENTS. JIBRATION: LEVEL AND DURATION - REFERENCE TABLE 1 SHOCK: 20G/11 MS - 3 AXES (6 DIRECTIONS) IHERMAL: 130 DEGREES F TO -23 DEGREES F (12 HAS PER CYCLE) (6 CYCLES) MINIDITY: 95% (120 DEGREES F TO 82 DEGREES F CYCLE IN 16 HRS) 10 CYCLES TOTAL. MC: MIL-STD-461 AS MODIFIED BY SL-E-0002 (TEST CEDI, CEO2, CEO3, CSO1 (DC/AC), CEO3, CSO1 (DC/AC), CEO3, CSO1, RSO4) SHY CHECKOUT SHY CHECKOUT SHY CHECKCUIT SOPS CHECKLIST (ALL VEHICLES) JSC 16987

APPROVED BY: ___

RMS/D&C - 135

PROJECT: SRMS ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL

SYSTEM: D&C SUBSYSTEM SSYY P/N: STICOESTY -

REF.	REV.	DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FATLURE MODE AND CAUSE	FATCURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOUR / FUNE. 1/1 RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE CRITICALETY
510	0	JOINT SELECT SWITCH GTY-1 P/M PS 87840 ME 452-0093. ED 92020 SHEET 1	MODE: SMITCH POSITION DOES NOT MATCH JOINT DRIVEN AND DATA DISPLAYED. CAUSE(S): (1) WIPER FAILS TO OME POSITION.	D/D WAFER: OHLY ONE JOINT WILL DRIVE IN DIRECT. SINGLE WAFER: ONLY ONE JOINT WILL DRIVE IN SINGLE AND ONLY ONE SET OF DATA WILL BE 01SPLAYED. WORST CASE UNEMPECTED MOTION, WRONG JOINT ORIVES. UNAMANGIATED. CREW ACTION REQ. REDAMOANT PATHS REMAINING N/A	HERNETICALLY SEALED ROTARY SWITCHES ARE PROCURED TO ROCKWELL SPECIFICATION MC552-0049, AS REQUIRED BY CAE SPEC. PS 87840. CAE PART NO. PS87840. QUALIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING OF SWITCHES IS PERFORMED TO RI. SPEC. NC452-0049. RECEIVING INSPECTION VERIFIES THAT SWITCHES RECEIVED ARE AS IDENTIFIED IN THE PROCURENENT DOCUMENTS. THAT NO PHYSICAL DANAGE NAS OCCURRED TO SWITCHES DURING SHIPMENT, THAT THE RECEIVING ODCUMENTS PROVIDE ADEQUATE TRACEABILITY INFORMATION AND ACCEPTANCE TEST DATA IDENTIFIES ACCEPTABLE PARTS. PARTS ARE INSPECTED THROUGHOUT MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY AS APPROPRIATE TO THE MANUFACTURING STAGE COMPLETED. THESE INSPECTIONS INCLUDE, COMPONENT MOUNTING TO FRONT PAMEL INSPECTION, CRIMPING OF CONTACTS TO SWITCH CONTECTOR, MIRE ROUTING, STRESS RELIEF OF WIRES ETC., OPERATORS AND INSPECTIONS TRAINED AND CERTIFIED FOR CRIMPING AND SOLDERING OPERATIONS TO CAE SPEC PO POIDS. DI AND NASA NHB 3500.4 (3A) STANDARD, AS MODIFIED BY JSC OBBOON. PRE-TEST INSPECTION OF DEC PAMEL ASSY INCLUDES AN AUDIT OF LOWER TIER INSPECTION CONFICTION, AS BUILD CONFIGURATION VERIFICATION TO AS DESIGN ETC. (SPAR/GOVERNMENT REP. MANDATORY INSPECTION FOR THE STATE OF MAY VALIDATION STATUS AND ANDROXED FOR THE STATE OF MAY FORMAL TESTING (ATENDAMENT TO CONTROL, SUPPLIER AS APPLICABLE, AND THE GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVE, PRIOR TO THE START OF ANY FORMAL TESTING (ACCEPTANCE OR QUALITY ASSURANCE IN COMJUNCTION WITH ENGINEERING, RELIBBATION / VALIDATION STATUS AND CALCERY, INTER CONVECT CARRE VERT FLOATION, CONNECTOR INSPECTION FOR SENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC. SUB-SYSIEM PERFORMANCE TESTING (AIP) INCLUDES AND BUILD TERFORMANCE, MANDATORY INSPECTION POINT). ATTERDATE OF THE STATE OF THE FLOATION, CONNECTOR INSPECTION FOR SENT OR PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC. SUB-SYSIEM PERFORMANCE TESTING (AIP) INCLUDES AND MENT OF FORMAL TESTING (AIP) INCLUDES AND MENT OF FORMAL TESTING (AIP) INCLUDES AND MENT OF FORMAL THE START OF PUSHBACK CONTACTS ETC. SUB-SYSIEM PERFORMANCE TESTING (AIP) INCLUDES AND MENT OF FORMANCE TEST. (MANDATORY INSPECTI

CRITICAL ITEMS LIST

PROJECT: SRMS

SYSTEM: DEC SUBSYSTEM

ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL

ASS'Y P/N: 51140E391

SHEET:

FREA REF.	REV.	NAME GTT E DRAWING REF. DESIGNATION	FATLURE NODE AND CAUSE	FATEURE EFFECY ON END TIEM	HOUR / FUND: 1/1 RATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE CRITICALETY
510	0	JOINT SELECT SWITCH 617-11 P/M PS 87840 NE 452-0093. ED 92020 SHEET 1	MODE: SWITCH POSITION DOES MOT HATCH JOINT DRIVEN AND DATA DISPLAYED. CAUSE(\$): {1} WIPER FAILS TO OME POSITION.	D/D WAFER: ONLY ONE JOINT WILL ORIVE IN DIRECT. SINGLE WAFER: ONLY ONE JOINT WILL DRIVE IN SINGLE AND ONLY ONE SET OF DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED. WORST CASE UMEMPECTED MOTION, WRONG JOINT DRIVES. UNAMMICIATED. CREW ACTION REG. REDUNDANT PATHS REMAINING	FAILURE HISTORY THERE HAVE BEEN NO FAILURES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS FAILURE MODE ON THE SRMS PROGRAM.
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PREPARED BY: MENG SUPERCEDING DATE: 11 SEP 86 APPROVED BY:

RMS/D&C - 137

PROJECT: SRMS ASS'Y NOMENCLATURE: DEC PANEL SYSTEM: DEC SUBSYSTEM

SHEET: 🕌

THEA REF.	REV.	NAME OTY 4 DRAWING RÉF. DESIGNATION	FAILURE MODE AND CAUSE	FAILURE EFFECT ON END ITEM	HOUR / FUNC. 1/1 AATIONALE FOR ACCEPTANCE CRITICALITY
\$10		JOINT SELECT SWITCH QTY-I P/M PS B7840 HE 452-0093. ED 92020 SHEET I	HODE: SUITCH POSITION DOES NOT MATCH JOINT DRIVEN AND: DATA DISPLAYED. CAUSE(S): (1) NIPER FAILS TO ONE POSITION.	O/D HAFER: OMLY ONE JOINT WILL DRIVE IN DIRECT. SINGLE HAFER: OMLY ONE JOINT WILL DRIVE IN SINGLE AND OMLY ONE SET OF DATA WILL BE DISPLAYED. WORST CASE UNEXPECTED HOTION, WRONG JOINT ORIVES. UNANHUHCHATEO. CREM ACTION REQ. REDUNDANT PATHS REMATNING M/A	WHEN ATTEMPTING TO DRIVE A JOINT IN SINGLE OR DIRECT. A JOINT OTHER THAN THE ONE SELECTED DRIVES. CREW ACTION REMOVE THE DRIVE COMMAND. CREW TRAINING THE CREW SHOULD BE TRAINED TO ALWAYS OBSERVE WHETHER THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERTY TO COMMANDS. IF IT ISN'T, THE COMMAND SHOULD BE REMOVED. MISSION CONSTRAINT THE OPERATOR HUST BE ABLE TO DETECT THAT THE ARM IS RESPONDING PROPERTY TO COMMANDS VIA WINDOW AND/OR CCTV WIEWS DURING ALL ARM OPERATIONS. SCREEN FAILURES N/A OHRSD OFFLINE FOR EACH POSITION OF THE JOINT SELECT SWITCH VERIFY CORRECT BUT OATA BUS VERIFY CORRECT BUT OATA BUS VERIFY CORRECT COMMAND VOLTAGES IN DIRECT DRIVE FOR SELECTED JOINT AT BACK PARKE OUTPUT OHRSD ONLINE INSTALLATION FOR EACH POSITION OF THE JOINT SELECT SWITCH VERIFY CORRECT COMMAND VOLTAGES IN DIRECT DRIVE FOR SELECTED JOINT AT LONGERON INTERFACE OHRSD ONLINE TURNAROUND EXERCISE JOINT SELECT SWITCH VERIFY SINGLE/DIRECT MODE FUNCTIONS FOR EACH JOINT VERIFY CORRECT TEMPERATURES DISPLAYED ON MRU

PREPARED BY: REUG

SUPERCEDING DATE: 06 OCT 67

APPROVED BY:

MTE: